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Abstract
As the economy and the business environment becomes more diverse and competitive, conflicts over scarce
resources are sharpening. In addition, computer networks and advanced telecommunication allow
individuals to connect with one another and work with social problems. In this paper we investigate
whether collaborative technology facilitate effective management of resource conflicts? Our assumption is
that attributions individuals make about others in their group will differ depending on the mode of
communication. We therefore predict different outcomes related to the management of resource conflicts
depending on motivational orientation and attributions that individuals draw as a result of the medium used
for negotiation of resource conflicts. This project consists of 2 studies. Due to space limitations we present
only the first study in this research-in-progress report.
Conflicts over scarce resources are sharpening, as the economy and the business environment becomes
more diverse and competition increases both within the US and among international groups. Conflicts over
scarce common pool resources such as water, fishing grounds, and shoreline are becoming more common
and more difficult to resolve as the groups concerned organize and initiate complicated litigations. The
Edwards Aquifer controversy and the tragic depletion of cod stock in the North Atlantic are only two wellknown instances of the hundreds of resource conflicts that arise every year in the US and internationally.
The cost of unmanaged resource conflicts can be immense, including depletion of irreplaceable resources,
economic ruin for those who depend on them, and social displacement and unrest. As the rate of change
and number of "players" in our economy increases, common pool resource conflicts are only likely to
increase.
In addition, the increasing availability of computer networks and advanced telecommunications opens up
new possibilities for connecting people and for working with social problems (Hightower & Sayeed, 1997).
In this paper we pose the following question: Can collaborative technology be used to facilitate the
effective management of resource conflicts? The focus of this project is (1) the use of a computer-mediated
communication (CMC) system to promote communication among parties in a resource conflict and (2) the
addition of a Group Support System (GSS) to the basic CMC system to help parties manage the conflict.
Group Support Systems supplement simpler CMC technology by adding structured procedures and agendas
to the basic communication tools. These higher order decision models help participants understand the
conflict better, generate and evaluate a range of solutions, and explore integrative solutions.
CMC is becoming increasingly common in our society with the spread of the internet and discussion
groups. It has been shown to promote communication and to open up organizations and social groups.
Paradoxically this could have both positive and negative impacts on resource conflicts. CMC may promote
conflict management by increasing understanding among parties. However, there is also evidence that
CMC may make achieving consensus more difficult (Poole, Holmes, & DeSanctis, 1991). CMC may also
worsen resource conflicts by facilitating the formation of opposing interest groups (Casey, 1996).
Some preliminary research on cognitive conflicts suggests that GSSs may promote more effective conflict
management than either simple CMC or face-to-face interaction (Sambamurthy & Poole, 1992). A model
similar to those built into GSSs was used during the complex negotiations that led to the Law and the Sea
Treaty (Nyhart & Samarasan, 1989). Case studies indicate that this model promoted constructive
negotiations much more effectively than face-to-face discussions. Our paper will shed light on the question
of potential advantages and pitfalls in the use of collaborative technologies in the management of resource
conflicts. Past research on behavior in resource dilemmas has demonstrated clearly that face-to-face

communication among group members increases levels of cooperation to conserve a common resource pool
(e.g., Dawes, McTavish, & Shaklee, 1977; Jorgenson & Papciak, 1981; Ostrom & Walker, 1991). It is less
clear why and how discussion works to elicit higher levels of cooperation (see Messick & Brewer, 1983;
Orbell et al., 1988; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994). The goals of this research are first, to determine
whether common pool resources can be managed effectively using GSS, rather than FTF communication,
and second, to determine what communication processes account for the effects of discussion through both
media. If GSS is found to mediate conflicts productively, then this finding could have far reaching
implications for the design of communication systems for larger-scale resource conflicts.
One important source of conflict among group members are the attributions that members make about each
others' motivations and intentions (Thomas & Pondy, 1977; Rutte, Messick, & Wilke, 1987; Sillars &
Weisberg, 1987). Motivational orientation (MO) refers to the preferences that a member has for allocation
of resources to self and others. Two MOs are particularly important: (1) individualistic: the motivation to
maximize one's own outcomes; and (2) cooperative: the motivation to maximize the sum of one's own and
others' joint outcomes. If a group member concludes that others desire to cooperate and harvest the resource
at reasonable levels, the member will reciprocate the cooperation (Thomas & Pondy, 1977). On the other
hand, if a group member concludes that others have adopted an individualistic MO, then he or she is less
likely to cooperate to conserve the resource.
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) differs from face-to-face (FTF) communication because it only
permits communication through written modes (El-Shinnawy & Markus, 1997). Cues received through
CMC are also more salient, since they are not competing with other cues available in FTF channels (Lea &
Speers, 1991; Walther & Burgoon, 1992). Hence, the first few cues are likely to have a more significant
impact on attributions in CMC than in FTF conditions. Two characteristics of cues will be explored in this
study: cues that signal motivational orientation (individualistic versus cooperative) and cues that signal
group identification (whether the communicator's MO is similar to or different from the receiver's). In the
first case, the first few comments of a communicator may indicate either competitive or cooperative
orientation. Hence, we would predict that:
H1: Attributions about other members' motivational orientations will be more definite and drawn with
more confidence in CMC conditions than in FTF conditions.
A group member's initial attributions should also influence his or her later behavior in the resource
management task, in some cases fueling and in other cases dampening the conflict:
H2: Attributions about motivational orientation will have a direct effect on cooperation in the resource
management task. Specifically, subjects who attribute individualistic MO to others will behave less
cooperatively when compared to members who attribute cooperative MO to others.
H3: Individualistic behavior of group members will result in greater negative impacts on resource pool
stock in CMC than in FTF conditions, due to stronger and more stable attributions drawn in CMC.
Cooperative behavior will result in greater conservation of the resource pool stock in CMC than in FTF
conditions.

Research Method
This study uses an experimental research method to contrast CMC groups with FTF groups. Groups of size
8 will be used because this number is sufficiently large to ensure a complex resource use situation.
Communication in both FTF and CMC conditions will follow the same protocol to eliminate confounding
discussion agenda with mode of communication effects. To test the hypotheses, the experimental groups
must have variance in the degree of cooperativeness of their initial discussion. We will manipulate this
through assignment of subjects to groups. Prior to the study we will give subjects a pretest to assess their
motivational orientation and assign them to groups based on cooperative or individualistic orientation.
Groups will be formed with the following motivational compositions: All 8 members cooperative; 6

cooperative, 2 individualistic; 4 cooperative, 4 individualistic; 2 cooperative, 6 individualistic; and all 8
individualistic. We use a 2 X 5 factorial design. The first variable will be communication mode [FTF,
CMC] and the second will be motivational composition [(8,0), (6,2), (4,4), (2,6), (0,8)].
Experimental Task: A graphics-based simulation of a commons dilemma situation based on fisheries will
be utilized as the experimental task. The program, FISH, simulates the process of harvesting of a fisheries
stock by multiple fishers and renewal of the stock through natural reproduction (Gifford & Wells, 1991).
FISH provides subjects with information on their own catch (harvest) rate, level of fish stock available,
replenishment rate, profits, costs, and other relevant parameters. Subjects play the game simultaneously,
interacting in real-time over a series of fishing seasons. Subjects may select different harvesting strategies
and collective behavior is reflected in the level of fish stock available. FISH is a complex, realistic
experimental stimulus that is well-suited for this study.
Experimental Setting: The CMC system provides computer conferencing over the internet. It enables
participants to engage in a discussion electronically. It also provides an electronic "flip chart" to enable
members to list ideas, and a rating tool to allow evaluation of ideas. No structure beyond this will be
imposed. All members of the conference will meet in the same room, which is equipped with 20
workstations. They will work with the FISH game and interact through the computer conference. Face-toface groups will also meet in the same room and work with the FISH game on the computers. However,
during their discussion period, they will convene in a breakout room with a circle of chairs and a flipchart
for recording ideas.
Procedure: Four weeks prior to the experiment, subjects will be given a pretest to assess their motivational
orientation (Liebrand & McClintock, 1988). Based on the results of this pretest, they will be classified into
sample subsets with cooperative and individualistic orientations. The experimental session will be divided
into five periods: (1) Subjects meet for basic instruction in FISH and the computer network. Subjects fill
out a pre-experimental questionnaire. (2) Subjects will play 10 rounds of FISH game. This is a sufficient
number to enable them to learn how the fish resource depletes in the group setting and to help them set a
basic strategy. (3) Subjects communicate with other group members. This session follows an agenda in
which each member makes a statement of his/her position initially and then discussion is opened up about
how to manage the resource. Free discussion via CMC or FTF mode continues for 15 minutes. Discussion
in the FTF mode will be videotaped. (4) Subjects play 10 more rounds of FISH game. This is a sufficient
number to determine individual strategies subsequent to discussion (and hence any communication effects)
and group outcomes. (5) Subjects fill out post-experimental questionnaire (including manipulation checks)
and are debriefed.
Measurement of Communication Behavior: Discussion is automatically captured by the CMC system. In
the FTF condition, the videotaped discussion will be transcribed. The transcripts of the discussions will be
coded for motivational orientation (cooperative or individualistic) of statements using a coding system to
be developed by the investigators. Several variables will index resource management effectiveness, such as
group harvest level, final pool size, number of fish replenished, mean individual profit, and mean group
profit. This range of outcomes will enable us to evaluate effectiveness at both the individual and group
levels. In addition, we can track individual game behavior before and after discussion to obtain a behavioral
measure of cooperation and individualism. Post-experimental measures include: attributions about others'
motivational orientation; own strategy; outcome satisfaction; perceptions of distributive justice.

Contributions
We expect our study to generate evidence on several points: (1) The impact, positive or negative, of
computer-mediated communication modes on management of common resource conflicts. If we find no
CMC impacts or if they are positive, then CMC might be used to get people talking about resource
conflicts. If this study finds the predicted negative impacts, then this is a caution about the use of CMC
without decision tools. (2) Whether advanced information technology in the form of a GSS can promote
better management of resource conflicts. If we find expected effects from GSS, this is information that can

be used to design CMC for discussion of resource dilemmas. If we do not, then it shows that more
encompassing tools are needed. (3) Preliminary guidelines for design of decision support systems for
common resource pool conflicts. The design and pilot testing stages of this project should provide advice
on the design of computer systems for resource dilemmas.
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